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OO often, the American Bar Association, the American Judicature
Society, and many state bar organizations have focused on merit se-
lection of judges to the exclusion of other reforms. Sometimes, the
efforts of these organizations have been counterproductive. They have al-
lowed the best, as they saw it, to be the enemy of the good. Poor methods,
even bizarre methods, of choosing judges have been perpetuated because bar
leaders feared that improving existing practices would stifle their hopes for
some ultimate, ideal selection process.
Trends in American politics are affecting the way we choose our judges.
Most of the states that still elect judges in partisan elections are located in
the South. This is perhaps because, for all practical purposes, Democratic
Party nomination in most southern states has been tantamount to election,
and the Democratic primary thus has functioned as a nonpartisan election.
The so-called Reagan revolution, however, is creating a two-party system in
much of the South.
Michigan faced a similar threat to judicial stability fifty years ago as a
result of the Roosevelt revolution. Before the New Deal, Michigan had par-
tisan election of judges just as Texas has today. One morning in 1936, the
Republican judges in Detroit woke up to find their jobs in serious jeopardy
of being taken over by a horde of Democrats with strange-sounding Polish,
Italian, and Irish names. They promptly initiated the movement for a non-
partisan judiciary, and by 1939 they had amended the Michigan constitution
to require nonpartisan nomination and election of judges.
The Michigan amendment had only one exception: the nomination of
supreme court justices was left to political party conventions. Each party
nominates candidates to run on a nonpartisan ballot against each other.
This practice is being challenged in Michigan today.
There has been one useful purpose served by Michigan's fifty-year experi-
ence with a nonpartisan elective method of choosing judges in which one
court continued to be nominated by partisan political conventions. The ex-
perience has provided a controlled experiment from which certain conclu-
sions about the two systems can be drawn.
The primary conclusion is that nonpartisan elections are far superior to
partisan election. Partisanship is a notion clearly at odds with impartiality,
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and impartiality is the goal of the judiciary. There is no place for party
discipline or party loyalty in the courts.
Moreover, partisanship is at odds with the central purpose of a proper
method of judicial selection and tenure. Any good system of judicial selec-
tion and tenure must have three principle objectives: (1) to attract and re-
tain the best qualified people on the bench; (2) to remove unqualified judges;
and (3) to maintain the confidence of the community in the judicial system.
The experience in Michigan suggests that the political parties always fill the
ticket. They always find a candidate to oppose an incumbent of the other
party. Even when the incumbent is fair-minded and qualified, the party op-
poses him because he is not "one of us." Many qualified incumbents have
been defeated in their reelection bids by candidates whose principle qualifica-
tion was loyalty to a different political party. In the last twenty years, six
members of the Michigan Supreme Court have been defeated at the polls.
Two were former chief justices. These six justices had nearly fifty years of
combined judicial experience. It has been an awful waste.
Partisan election of judges is bad. It has survived only in those states that
have not enjoyed vigorous two-party politics. Partisan elections may disap-
pear from the American scene rather soon, especially in light of Storer v.
Brown and similar cases, which are breaking the partisan stranglehold on
American politics generally.
But if partisan judicial elections are bad, nonpartisan elections are good.
To foster and maintain the confidence of the community in our courts, it is
important that the public have a proprietary feeling about the judicial sys-
tem. Other cultures can accept a justice system administered by their elders,
hereditary Levites, or monarchial appointees; but in America, community
confidence requires a perception that courts are of the people, by the people,
and for the people.
Access and participation must exist at two levels. First, citizens must feel
welcome to use the courts as litigants and to participate in the work of the
courts as jurors, witnesses, and attorneys. Second, there must also be open,
public access to judicial careers by those who legitimately aspire to be
judges, and a commonly accepted public participation in the process of
choosing, retaining, and removing judges. For this reason, American judges
should be elected, as they are in one way or another in three quarters of the
states of our union.
Where judicial elections are nonpartisan, there is no unseemly turnover of
judges. During the same period in Michigan when the party-nominated
supreme court justices were in a revolving door of election and defeat, no
incumbent judge of Michigan's nonpartisan intermediate court of appeals
was defeated. In fact, twenty of twenty-seven reelections in that court have
been uncontested. No incumbent has ever been required to compete in a
primary election, and only new appointees have had serious opposition.
In a very real sense, every system of judicial selection begins with a law-
yer's aspiration to become a judge. The ethics of our profession tell us that a
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lawyer's ambition to judicial office should be governed by an objective assess-
ment of his or her capacity to add honor to the bench.
The Michigan experience is that lawyers are, by and large, faithful to
those ideals. Moreover, the practical realities of getting elected reinforce
that ethical standard. If a judge is doing a good job and enjoys the confi-
dence of the community, the bar will leave him alone. In a nonpartisan
elective system, he will be unopposed and have no need to campaign, raise
money, or go out on the stump.
On the other hand, the Michigan experience has been that in nonpartisan
elected circuit and district courts, when a judge loses the confidence of the
community, he also loses the confidence of members of the bar. Opposition
will surface. Judges who should be defeated are defeated. This has hap-
pened over and over again.
The process known as retention election has nothing to do with judicial
selection. It relates only to judicial tenure. Thus, retention election does not
relate so much to attracting and retaining good judges as it does to removing
bad ones.
In Michigan there are four methods of removing judges. First, a judge
can be impeached. Second, a judge can be removed by the governor upon
the recommendation of a concurrent resolution of two-thirds of the members
of both houses of the legislature. Third, a judge can be removed by the
supreme court upon the recommendation of the judicial tenure commission.
Fourth, a judge can be defeated for reelection.
No judge in Michigan has ever been impeached. None have been removed
by the governor or legislature. Very few have been ousted by the supreme
court and the tenure commission. Many judges, however, have been retired
by the voters. In contrast to the partisan blood-letting in the supreme court,
the nonpartisan election defeats have reflected loss of community confidence
based almost always upon diminished or controverted judicial ability and
performance.
It is interesting that the one method of judicial removal that Michigan
does not have is recall. All other elected officials in Michigan are subject to
recall elections upon the petitions of a certain percentage of the voters. By
constitution, our judges are exempt from that process.
The reason for this constitutional exemption is that a judge must often
make unpopular decisions. He should not be called to account, out of due
season, for the public acceptance of a particular ruling or opinion. It is bet-
ter and safer to judge the judges only in the regular election cycle when their
total record can be considered in better focus. Moreover, the recall of a
judge is essentially a negative campaign. It is marked by criticism, invec-
tives, charges of misfeasance, and other negative accusations. There is no
way to oust a judge in a public recall campaign without spilling a great deal
of those negative public sentiments on the judicial office itself.
In Michigan, as elsewhere, public confidence in and respect for public of-
fice holders is never lower than in the midst of a recall campaign. It is diffi-
cult to see how the confidence and respect of the community can be
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maintained on a high level by courts whose judges are the subject of con-
tested retention elections. Even when a judge wins a contested retention
election, the aroma of criticism remains. Even if only one-third of the citi-
zens are on record as believing that Judge A is lazy, intemperate, and rude,
isn't the judicial system injured? Is Judge A really vindicated, or will he be
more likely to be vindictive? And when is a retention election ever uncon-
tested? Every elected official is well-advised to run scared. Is the severity of
an incumbent's paranoia the proper measure of his reelective effort?
In a nonpartisan election system, good judges are usually unopposed. In
Michigan unopposed judicial candidates must return campaign funds that
were raised before the filing date, and they may not raise any more. Every-
body gets a free ride. How is that possible in a retention election system?
Some judges harbor nightmares of negative newspaper editorials appearing
on the day before the election. Can they ever be sure that no positive image-
building is necessary? It was suggested in Illinois that a judge who loses a
retention election be barred from holding any public office for at least ten
years. Nonretention is seen as a disgrace, a rejection. Defeat in a contested
nonpartisan election leaves the former judge his honor and self-respect at
least. Furthermore, it is much easier to protect public esteem for the courts
if the newspaper editorial can endorse candidate B and comment on his rep-
utation for scholarship, punctuality, temperance, and courtesy, instead of
attacking Judge A because he is dumb, late, drunk, and rude.
On the whole, a system that allows for both contested and uncontested
nonpartisan reelection of judges is better than the "yes" or "no" retention
elections that have been tried by many states over the last several decades.
Nonpartisan election and reelection, however, is not only a good way to get
rid of bad judges; it is also a good way to put judges on the bench in the first
place. In Michigan, there is a dual method of original selection. Because the
governor has the power to fill judicial vacancies, many judges come to the
bench in the first instance by gubernatorial appointment. On the other hand,
when new judgeships are created, when judges retire at the end of their term
of office, and when incumbents are replaced by the voters, there are opportu-
nities for judicial aspirants to be elected in the first instance. This is espe-
cially common in the lower courts.
What kind of judges do the people elect? Putting it another way, what
kind of people get to be judges in an elective system, as opposed, for exam-
ple, to federal judges, who are appointed for life? Two years ago a study of
the trial courts of general jurisdiction in Wayne County, Michigan revealed
some interesting comparisons between those who are selected for appointive
judgeships and those who are either elected or appointed to elective
judgeships.
At the time of the study, there were fifteen federal district court judges in
the Eastern District of Michigan. They, of course, were all appointed. The
following facts illustrate their demographics. There were fourteen males and
one female. The group included nine white Anglo-Saxon Protestants, two
Catholics, two Jews, and two blacks. Nine of the federal judges in Detroit
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attended the University of Michigan Law School. There was one judge from
each of the following law schools: University of Detroit, Wayne State Uni-
versity, Detroit College of Law, Georgetown, Yale, and the University of
Iowa. The average age of the federal judges was 62.6 years.1 Only four of
the judges had previous judicial experience. Two of these four had first
come to judicial office by election.
The state trial courts of general civil and criminal jurisdiction in Wayne
County are the circuit and recorders courts. Together, they consisted of
sixty-three judges, of whom fifty-one were male and twelve were female.
There were only five white Anglo-Saxon Protestants on the circuit and re-
corders benches. 2 There were thirty-one Catholics, seven Jews, and twenty-
one black judges. 3 Law schools represented were the University of Detroit
(25), Wayne State University (16), Detroit College of Law (14), and one
judge each from DePaul, Notre Dame, University of Pennsylvania, and New
York University. Only four of the sixty-three state court judges graduated
from the University of Michigan. 4 The average age of circuit and recorders
judges was fifty years, fully ten years younger than their counterparts on the
federal bench. Forty-nine percent of the state judges had some previous ju-
dicial experience, whereas only twenty-seven percent of the appointed fed-
eral judges had such experience. Thirty-four of the state court judges, or
fifty-four percent, first achieved judicial office by way of election. Twenty-
nine judges, or forty-six percent, were originally appointed by the governor
to fill a vacancy.
The results of this survey suggest the following conclusions. In Detroit
the elective system is more open to women and minorities. It produces a
bench that more nearly reflects the ethnic mix in the community. The elec-
tive system produces a younger bench and one that is more likely to be filled
by younger, career jurists who move up the ladder from lower courts, rather
than older lawyers who enter the judiciary at a higher level directly from the
law practice.
The survey also raises two interesting and perhaps troubling questions:
are white Anglo-Saxon Protestant graduates of the University of Michigan
over-represented on the appointive federal district court, or are they under-
represented on the elective state courts? The answer to both questions may
be "yes." As stated above, the process of judicial selection always begins in
the heart and mind of the judicial aspirant. A lawyer decides that he or she
wants to be a judge. By and large, most lawyers who aspire to be judges are
well motivated and at the outset, at least, rather idealistic about the judicial
role. The fact is, however, that being a judge is a job, a way to make a living.
Furthermore, judicial service is not as attractive a career option for a lawyer
1. If the two senior judges are not included, the average would still be 60 years.
2. Thus, white Anglo-Saxon Protestants comprised 60 percent of the federal appointees,
but only eight percent of the state court judges.
3. The sum of the ethnic figures for state judges is 64 rather than 63 because one of the
black judges was also Catholic.
4. Thus, University of Michigan Law School graduates occupied 60 percent of the ap-
pointed federal positions, but only six percent of the state court positions.
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who graduates with good grades from a prestige law school as it is for a
graduate of a so-called local law school.
It should come as no surprise that there is an ugly caste system in Ameri-
can legal education. Graduates of certain law schools are welcomed into big,
prestige law firms that pay good salaries. These firms represent big, prestige
clients who pay large fees and expect their lawyers to be smarter than the
judges before whom they appear. Fortunately for America, the clients very
often do not get their money's worth. The elitist presumption that selects
seventy-five percent of the law clerks in the United States Supreme Court
from only eight of the 175 A.B.A.-approved law schools is grievously in
error.
To the extent that this same elitist mentality fosters efforts of the organ-
ized bar to change the method of judicial selection to so-called "merit" selec-
tion, it is also misplaced. A judiciary should reflect the diversity of people,
not because judges represent people in the legislative sense, but because the
wisdom and experience of the whole people must be brought to bear upon
the constantly expending area of judicial decisions. In order to enjoy the
confidence of the community, the courts need more than high L.S.A.T.
scores, good grade point averages, and diplomas from prestige universities.
Judges must be perceived as caring, concerned, courageous, and compassion-
ate. When it comes to human understanding, there is no substitute for per-
sonal experience. Only a black man or woman can know what America
looks like from his or her perspective; only a Jew can appreciate the common
feeling of other Jews living in a predominantely Christian culture. No man
can fully understand or faithfully reflect a woman's point of view. People
instinctively know these things. The tradition that dictates that a citizen be
tried before a jury of his peers, drawn from the vicinage, commands that
judges have similar credentials.
The evils often cited as endemic to the election of judges are frequently
exaggerated. A typical complaint is that people do not know the candidates
for whom they are voting. The fact that citizens randomly stopped at the
supermarket cannot name their local judges, however, is hardly a valid test.
They probably cannot name legislators or school board members either.
College students will tell you that a surprise quiz is unfair. They will pre-
pare before the examination. Thomas Jefferson said that if the voters make
unwise or foolish choices, the remedy is not to disenfranchise them, but to
inform their discretion. To say that voters do not know what they are doing
is a glib denigration of democracy. Voters who do their homework do know
the candidates for whom they are voting, and they are jealous of their electo-
ral prerogative. Moreover, those informed and knowledgeable people are
the community leaders. They are the very people who need to be enlisted in
any effort to change the system from election to appointment.
In order to disenfranchise the indifferent, the apathetic, and the unin-
formed, it is also necessary to disenfranchise the responsible and the inter-
ested, and to engender their enthusiastic support. This is not very easy to
do. For this reason, every time a merit selection system has been proposed
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in Michigan, it has either failed to get on the ballot, or it has been defeated
by the voters. The people of Michigan like to elect their judges, they want to
elect their judges, and they will elect their judges for the foreseeable future.
And the people of Michigan are not alone. In fact, the only places where
state judges do not appear on the ballot in America are in New England and
along the Eastern Seaboard. In three of those states, Connecticut, Virginia,
and South Carolina, the legislature appoints judges.
It is time to recognize that election is going to continue to be an integral
part of the American process of judicial selection and tenure. Consequently,
we should take the position that the elective process should be made as effec-
tive as possible to achieve the three goals of any system of judicial selection
and tenure: attraction and retention of good judges; removal of bad judges;
and maintenance of community confidence. The following standards for ju-
dicial elections are proposed to meet these goals:
(1) All judicial elections should be nonpartisan;
(2) Incumbent judges should be identified on the ballot as incumbents;
(3) Nominations should be by open, nonpartisan primary elections;
(4) A substantial number of petition signatures should be required for
a nonincumbent to obtain a position on the primary ballot;
(5) Incumbent judges should be allowed to file by affidavit without
petitions;
(6) Each judgeship should be separately voted upon;
(7) No more than two candidates should appear on the general elec-
tion ballot for each judicial seat;
(8) If a candidate is unopposed, he or she should not be allowed to
campaign.
Of course, there may be other standards that might be considered to improve
the elective process.
Beyond legislative enactments, involvement and commitment by the legal
profession in the whole enterprise of recruiting, selecting, and retaining good
judges as well as removing bad ones is crucial to any method of judicial
selection. Lawyers too often say, "Oh, everytime the bar association en-
dorses a candidate, the other fellow wins the election," or "It takes a million
dollars to get elected statewide. It's all controlled by special interests and
rich people who buy T.V. commercials." I am troubled by comments like
these from lawyers who ought to have more confidence in democracy and a
deeper commitment to republican ideals.
Around the world, he process of self-government is in jeopardy. In South
America, the Middle East, the Philippines, Africa, and southeast Asia, our
planet festers with places where the will of the majority of the people is
frustrated by gunfire and where the exercise of the franchise is a matter of
life and death. Lawyers, of all people, ought to understand that there is no
easy substitute for self-government and that justice and freedom, law and
liberty, cannot long endure without democracy. It behooves the lawyers of
the nation to take the lead and to revive the once universal hope that govern-
ment of the people, by the people, and for the people shall not perish from
this Earth.
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